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The binding nature of circuit precedents established in published 
panel opinions is a familiar part of the court of appeals environment. 
Sixth Circuit rule 206(c) states that “[r]eported panel opinions are 
binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a 
published opinion of a previous panel.”2 There can be little doubt, 
though, that the second quoted sentence is on firmer ground than the 
first. Three-judge panels simply do not overrule other panels’ previous 
decisions in subsequent cases in the absence of an intervening Supreme 
Court or en banc decision. But that does not mean that subsequent panels 
always comply with previous panel decisions. In practice, there are many 
techniques courts of appeals judges may use to evade precedents they do 
not wish to follow. They may, for example, distinguish the present case 
from the precedent on factual grounds and thus reach a decision contrary 
to the one directed by the precedent. They may find an earlier (or later) 
precedent pointing in a different direction and rely on that precedent 
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instead of the disfavored one. Or they may even conclude that an 
intervening Supreme Court or en banc precedent has undermined the 
disfavored precedent, even when reaching such a conclusion is, well, a 
reach. 
On the one hand, then, there is a strict rule of horizontal stare 
decisis. On the other hand, there is a more-than-reasonable suspicion that 
judges can evade that rule, at least some of the time. The pertinent issues 
for empirical study, then, are: (1) how often do panels of the courts of 
appeals comply with their own precedents, (2) under what conditions are 
panels more likely to comply with precedent, and (3) under what 
conditions are they less likely to comply? 
To answer these questions, of course, one must first operationalize 
the concept of “compliance” and devise an empirical measure for it. A 
number of potential measures of compliance are readily available. In a 
previous article on Sixth Circuit compliance with circuit precedent, for 
example, I used Keycite positive and negative treatment codes as proxy 
measures for compliance and non-compliance.3 Other researchers have 
employed Shepard’s Citations for a similar purpose.4 In addition, studies 
of lower court compliance with Supreme Court precedent in civil 
liberties cases have used a measure of compliance based on the outcome 
of the cases involved.5 This outcome-based measure works on the 
assumption that precedents typically have a policy dimension in that they 
favor one “side” in a particular policy area, e.g., the creation of Miranda 
rights6 favors criminal defendants in future cases. Using this measure, 
then, one determines whether the judge(s) citing the precedent reach an 
outcome in the same policy direction as that of the cited precedent, e.g., 
pro-criminal defendant or “liberal,” to measure compliance.7 
In this Article I analyze whether three-judge panels of the Sixth 
Circuit reached outcomes pointing in the opposite policy direction than 
the precedents cited to support their decisions. The analysis includes 
almost 500 citing cases (n = 499). I find that three-judge panels complied 
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with cited circuit precedents’ policy direction in 60.7% of the sampled 
citing cases. This estimate of compliance is considerably lower than the 
comparable 81.2% figure obtained using Keycite codes to analyze the 
same cases.8 Moreover, the overall estimate masks different dynamics in 
sampled published and unpublished decisions. The outcome-based 
compliance figure is much lower in published citing cases, 54.2%, than 
in unpublished citing cases, 67.9%. Indeed, regression analysis reveals 
that, in published cases, the policy preferences of the subsequent panel 
majority is the key explanatory variable but that in unpublished cases the 
direction of the cited precedent is the key explanatory variable. This 
finding strongly suggests that there is an important difference between 
published and unpublished cases in terms of the discretion judges enjoy 
in such cases to reach decisions in accord with their policy preferences. 
This provides empirical support for the conventional wisdom that 
unpublished cases generally represent “easy” cases, i.e., cases in which 
the applicable legal materials point to one and only one outcome.9 
The remainder of this Article is organized in the following way. 
Part I discusses recent research on measures of compliance, which 
suggests that an outcome-based measure of compliance offers a rather 
straightforward means of capturing this complex concept. Part II 
specifies the hypotheses of interest and explains the data collection and 
coding procedures used in this study. Part III presents my findings using 
the outcome-based measure of compliance. Overall, I find support for the 
hypotheses advanced in Part II. Part III also provides a comparison of the 
outcome-based measure to the Keycite measure of compliance. Part IV 
provides a brief conclusion along with suggestions for future research. 
I. MEASURING COMPLIANCE 
Like most other concepts of interest to social scientists, 
“compliance” is a complicated matter. It is not always clear what it 
means to comply with a previous decision, partly because it is not always 
clear what a previous decision actually “holds.”10 To make matters even 
worse, quantitative researchers need a measure of compliance that is 
valid, reliable, and not overly subjective or dependent on the person 
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coding the cases. Three potential quantitative measures of compliance 
are readily available: Shepard’s Citations, Westlaw Keycite, and the 
outcome-based measure. Researchers have used each of these measures 
in the past, but which should researchers use in the future? In a recent 
study of state high-court compliance with Supreme Court precedent, 
political scientists McClurg and Comparato11 provide much-needed 
guidance on this question. McClurg and Comparato carefully divided the 
concept of compliance into four “dimensions” of scholarly interest: (1) 
the treatment of the legal principle found in the precedent; (2) the 
application of the precedent to a specific set of facts; (3) the policy effect 
of the precedent in terms of the party favored by the rule found in the 
precedent; and (4) the use of the cited precedent to justify the decision in 
a specific case.12 They then compared the ability of the competing 
measures to gauge compliance with Supreme Court precedent along 
these dimensions by creating their own, content-based measure of 
compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Gates,13 and 
by applying each of these four measures to a sample of thirty-nine state 
high-court decisions citing Gates.14 
McClurg and Comparato found that each ready-to-hand quantitative 
measure of compliance had its advantages and disadvantages.15 
Shepard’s is the only measure that allows for a neutral code, i.e., the 
“Cited By” code. But because of this, Shepard’s often incorrectly 
categorizes compliant or non-compliant behavior as “neutral.”16 The 
other measures, however, tend to err in categorizing citations as 
compliant or non-compliant when they are really “neutral.”17 McClurg 
and Comparato found that Keycite tends to code decisions as compliant 
(i.e., “positive” treatment) even when the content-based measure would 
have categorized them as non-compliant.18 Keycite, in short, is biased 
toward overestimating compliance, compared to the content-based 
measure. Similarly, the outcome-based measure is biased toward 
overestimating non-compliance, compared to the content-based 
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 14 McClurg & Comparato, supra note 11, at 13. 
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 16 Id. at 20, 23-24, 28. 
 17 Id. at 23, 28. 
 18 Id. at 28 (“[T]he Achilles heal of Keycite is a tendency toward false positives . . . 
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measure.19 The reason for this tendency seems clear. A subsequent 
decision may reach a different result and still comply, substantively, with 
cited precedent. For example, the facts of the subsequent case may 
actually differ in legally relevant ways from those in the cited precedent. 
But when this occurs, the outcome-based measure will always code the 
subsequent decision as non-compliant. 
After examining the performance of each measure of compliance 
for each of the four dimensions, McClurg and Comparato combined the 
different dimensions of compliance to compare the quantitative measures 
of compliance to their content-based measure overall.20 They found that 
Shepard’s correctly classified ten of the seventeen non-compliant 
decisions in the sample,21 Keycite correctly classified nine out of the 
seventeen, and the outcome-based measure correctly classified fifteen 
out of the seventeen.22 This last figure (fifteen out of seventeen) makes 
sense, because a non-compliant decision will generally point in the 
opposite policy direction from the cited precedent. Thus, the outcome-
based measure should do a better job than the quantitative alternatives in 
identifying non-compliant decisions. In terms of correctly classifying 
compliant decisions, however, Keycite performed somewhat better than 
the other quantitative measures.23 Most notably, the outcome-based 
measure incorrectly classified the seven cases McClurg and Comparato 
classified as “weak compliance” as non-compliant.24 Again, this makes 
sense, as not every decision pointing in the opposite policy direction is 
actually non-compliant. The outcome-based measure will incorrectly 
classify every such decision, however.25 
In terms of measuring all four dimensions of compliance, McClurg 
and Comparato offered the following advice to researchers: 
First, for scholars interested in measuring only the treatment of 
legal principle [this study] shows that Shepard’s is the best 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id. at 28-29. 
 20 Id. at 25-26. 
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noncompliance. However, we would be remiss if we did not point out that in 
terms of measuring overall compliance, the outcome measure’s false 
negatives are almost entirely of a specific type—treating weak forms of 
compliance as noncompliance—that is not as clearly egregious of a mistake 
as some of those made by the other two measures. 
Id. at 28-29. 
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measure as it has the highest percent correct and is capable of 
identifying irrelevance. Both Keycite and the outcome measure 
hover around the 50-percent mark and are incapable of dealing 
with cases where this dimension is not at all relevant. Second, [if] 
interest[ed] in measuring the remaining three dimensions of 
compliance [,] scholars would be best accomplished by using the 
Keycite measure. On a dimension-by-dimension basis, Keycite is 
the superior measure for distinguishing between compliant and 
noncompliant lower court cases. Along these same lines, 
Shepard’s is by far the weakest of the three measures. Finally, if 
we consider all four dimensions together, the outcome measure 
outperforms both Shepard’s and Keycite. Although using the 
outcome of a case is not useful for measuring one particular 
element of compliance, the evidence in the final column of Table 
7 suggests that its strength is capturing the concept more 
generally. This also has some substantive importance, as it 
suggests that compliance is closely linked to . . . case outcomes.26 
In sum, the results of the McClurg and Comparato study indicate 
that researchers interested in measuring compliance with precedent 
“should consider using an outcome based measure” for compliance, in 
part because “it has the highest level of content validity with respect to 
measurement of the general phenomenon of compliance.”27 At the same 
time, researchers should be aware of this measure’s potential bias toward 
coding compliant behavior, especially weakly compliant behavior, as 
non-compliant.28 
In this Article, I follow the advice of McClurg and Comparato and 
use the outcome-based measure of compliance to study the efficacy of 
the norm of horizontal stare decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit. This is an important theoretical question in its own right. 
Having already conducted an analysis of compliance using the Keycite 
measure, in this Article I am also able to compare the two measures and 
contribute to the discussion of measurement error in this research area. 
The next part explains the hypotheses of interest and the details of the 
research design employed in this study. 
                                                                                                             
 26 Id. at 28 (citation omitted). 
 27 Id. at 32. 
 28 Id. at 28-29. To test this in another legal context, McClurg and Comparato sampled 
search and seizure cases in the state supreme courts and measured non-compliance with 
relevant Supreme Court precedents using the three quantitative measures. Id. at 30-31, 
Table 8. They found that Shepard’s coded about 0.5% of the sampled cases as non-
compliant, Keycite 2.3%, and the outcome-based measure 38.6%. They concluded that 
although this 38.6% estimate was “inflated,” it might serve as a kind of “upper boundary 
estimate for all forms of noncompliance.” Id. at 31. 
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II. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. Hypotheses 
This Article focuses on a limited number of variables, primarily the 
composition of panel majorities in the citing cases, the policy direction of 
the cited and citing cases, and whether the opinion in the citing case is 
published or unpublished. The first hypothesis of interest involves the 
policy preferences of the citing panel. Court researchers simply lack 
anything resembling a direct, fully satisfactory measure of lower-court 
judicial policy preferences. A vast body of literature, however, 
documents that judges appointed by Republican presidents have different 
policy preferences than those appointed by Democratic presidents.29 
With respect to that literature, the leading political science work on the 
U.S. courts of appeals concludes that “[t]he general picture presented by 
these studies is clear: across a wide variety of courts and issue areas, 
Democratic judges are more likely to support the liberal position in case 
outcomes than their Republican colleagues.”30 Moreover, the ongoing 
controversy regarding the appropriate role of judicial ideology in judicial 
confirmations demonstrates that policy-makers recognize that judges’ 
policy preferences vary according to partisanship.31 Given these 
differences in policy preferences, one would expect that a panel 
dominated by Democratic judges32 would be more likely to disagree with 
a conservative-direction precedent than a panel dominated by Republican 
judges, and that a Republican-dominated panel would be more likely to 
disagree with a liberal-direction precedent than a Democratic-dominated 
panel.33 Thus, the first hypothesis of interest: 
                                                                                                             
 29 See DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS 110-119 (2000) (providing a synthetic overview of the literature with 
a full-range of citations). Measuring appellate judge policy preferences by reference to 
the party of the appointing president certainly has its limitations, but previous studies 
have shown that partisanship measured by “presidential cohorts” explains “a substantial 
portion of the variation in judicial voting.” Id. at 118. See also Frank B. Cross & Emerson 
H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L. J. 2155 (1988). 
 30 Id. at 112. Throughout the remainder of the Article, I will follow this usage and 
refer to judges nominated by Democratic presidents as Democratic judges and judges 
nominated by Republican presidents as Republican judges. 
 31 See Emery G. Lee III, The Federalist in an Age of Faction: Rethinking Federalist 
No. 76 on the Senate’s Role in the Judicial Confirmation Process, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
235, 237-43 (2004), for a useful discussion of the contemporary debate. 
 32 I.e., a panel on which a majority of the judges are Democratic judges. 
 33 This should be true regardless of the composition of the panel that decided the 
cited precedent. My previous work suggests that it is the policy direction of the cited 
precedent and not the composition of the panel that decided the precedent that explains 
variation in compliance. See Lee, Horizontal Stare Decisis, supra note 3, at 785-89. For 
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H1: Democratic-Dominated Citing Panels Are More Likely than 
Republican-Dominated Panels Not to Comply with Conservative 
Direction Precedents, and Republican-Dominated Panels Are 
More likely Not to Comply with Liberal-Direction Precedents, 
All Else Equal. 
This relationship will probably not be symmetrical, however. The 
policy direction of the cited precedent should also affect the overall level 
of compliance, regardless of the composition of the citing majority, 
although the reasons for this are not as readily apparent. Overall, I expect 
that compliance, using the outcome-based measure, will be greater for 
conservative-direction precedents than for liberal-direction precedents. 
To understand why, one must consider the nature of “liberal-direction 
precedents.” As will be discussed infra, the sample includes only civil 
liberties and civil rights cases. Given the court of appeals docket, the 
sampled precedents are largely criminal appeals rather than First 
Amendment cases or even Title VII discrimination suits. In a criminal 
appeal, a liberal-direction decision is almost always a reversal of the 
district court in some respect.34 But the courts of appeals affirm the 
district courts in an overwhelming majority of cases. Thus, liberal-
direction, pro-defendant decisions should be less common than 
conservative-direction, pro-prosecution decisions even when the cited 
precedent is a liberal-direction precedent. Thus, the second hypothesis of 
interest is: 
H2: Compliance is more Likely for Conservative-Direction 
Precedents than for Liberal-Direction Precedents. 
Finally, I expect that the citing panel’s decision to publish the 
subsequent opinion will be positively correlated with non-compliance; in 
general, non-compliance should be more common in published citing 
cases than in unpublished citing cases. This expectation reflects the 
conventional wisdom that unpublished cases tend to be routine cases, i.e., 
                                                                                                             
example, when a policy direction variable is included in the model, the coefficient for the 
variable comparing the policy preferences of the citing and cited panels does not reach 
statistical significance. See id. at 787 (Table 3). I concluded in that previous Article: “In 
sum, the ideological composition of the panels involved is important because of its 
consequences for the direction of the [cited] precedent; however, the ideological 
composition of the panels, alone, does not explain variation in the negative treatment of 
precedents.” Id. at 790. 
 34 I.e., a liberal direction will almost always be a pro-criminal defendant decision in 
that defendant’s appeal of his or her conviction and/or sentence. Thus, almost all such 
decisions will vacate the conviction and/or sentence and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
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cases governed by clearly established precedent.35 Given the lack of 
judicial discretion in such cases, non-compliance should be less likely. 
Thus, the third hypothesis of interest: 
H3: Compliance with the Cited Precedent is More Likely in 
Unpublished Citing Cases than in Published Citing Cases. 
B. Data Collection 
The sample used to test these hypotheses was collected as follows. 
First, precedents decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1995 and 1996 were 
identified from the Federal Reporter 3d Series. These years were 
selected because previous research has found that the average “half-life” 
of a non-Supreme Court precedent cited in a court of appeals case was 
4.3 years; i.e., half of the citations to lower federal court precedents 
occurred within 4.3 years of its decision date.36 Sampling precedents 
from the mid-1990’s, then, should mean that the study will include most 
of the citations to the sampled precedents that will occur. For each 
sampled precedent, records were made of the case number, the authoring 
judge, panel membership, outcome in terms of ideological direction, and 
decision date.37 The sample was limited to precedents involving criminal 
procedure, including sentencing issues, civil rights claims of race or sex 
discrimination, and the violation of federally guaranteed rights.38 Such 
cases comprise a significant part of the Sixth Circuit’s docket and, more 
importantly, permit one to code the ideological direction of case 
outcomes. 39 In this context, the outcome variable was coded “liberal” if 
any relief (including partial relief) was granted to the defendant on the 
relevant issue in criminal procedure cases, and “conservative” if all relief 
                                                                                                             
 35 There is, however, more that one could say on this matter. See Lee, supra note 3, at 
790 n.90, and sources cited therein. 
 36 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 255 (1976). 
 37 Additional data on variables not discussed in this Article were also collected. See 
Lee, supra note 3, at 779-81. 
 38 In other words, civil rights cases were sampled when they involved either Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The latter category includes several 
important cases on the issue of qualified immunity. 
 39 The sampled precedents can be found in volumes 50-102 of the Federal Reporter, 
3d Series. I began with volume 50 and collected data on all published Sixth Circuit cases 
meeting the sampling rules until a sufficient number of subsequent citations had been 
collected for logistic regression analysis. The author, in other words, examined and did 
citation checks on all published criminal procedure, sentencing, and civil rights cases 
decided by three-judge panels of the Sixth Circuit that were published in these volumes 
of the reporter. Volume 50 was not selected as my starting point for any particular reason, 
other than the fact that 50 “seemed like a nice round number.” COOL HAND LUKE (Jalem 
Productions of Warner Bros. (u.s.) 1967). 
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was denied. In civil rights cases, the outcome variable was coded 
“liberal” if the panel held in the plaintiffs’ favor on the relevant issue and 
“conservative” when the panel held in the defendants’ favor. The panel 
membership variables were coded to reflect the party of the appointing 
president of the three judges on the panel. 
Subsequent citations to the sampled precedents by three-judge 
panels of the Sixth Circuit were then located using the Westlaw Keycite 
service.40 Citing cases were included in the sample if the treatment of the 
precedent was coded as negative (including “Distinguished”) or if the 
treatment was coded as positive and the citing case either “explained” or 
“discussed” the precedent. This means that subsequent cases that merely 
cited the sampled precedent, positively, without discussion, as in a string 
citation, were omitted from the sample of citing cases. The reason for 
this coding decision is that such brief “positive” citations generally do 
not signal that the citing panel relied, in any substantive sense, on the 
cited case for an important question of law. If the citing panel does not 
rely on the precedent in reaching its decision, then the citation cannot 
really be characterized as “compliance.” By contrast, even a brief 
“negative” treatment represents some level of “non-compliance” with the 
policy represented in the cited precedent. Unpublished opinions, 
including per curiam opinions, were included in the sample of citing 
cases. 
As with the sampled precedents, records were compiled including 
the following information: case citation, the treatment of the precedent, 
publication, party of the president appointing the judges on the panel, 
case outcome in terms of ideological direction, and the decision date. 
The panel membership and outcome variables were coded as in the 
sampled precedents. In multiple issue cases, great care was taken to 
ensure that the outcome variable was coded according to the direction of 
the outcome on the issue or issues for which the precedent was cited. 
III. FINDINGS 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
The data summarized in Table 1 reveal that subsequent panels 
complied with cited circuit precedents 60.7% of the time, in all cases, 
                                                                                                             
 40 The original study employed Keycite both to find cases and to code the compliance 
variable; in the present study, Keycite was used only for the latter purpose. A citing case 
is included more than one case in the sample if it cites more than one of the sampled 
precedents; the unit of analysis is the citation of precedent rather than the citing case, 
strictly speaking. However, there are 422 distinct citing cases in the sample, accounting 
for 499 observations (citations to precedent), so few cases are included more than twice. 
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measured by the policy direction of the precedent and citing case. In 
other words, citing panels did not comply with the policy direction of 
cited precedents almost 40% of the time. This percentage is slightly 
misleading, however, because the figures for published and unpublished 
cases are substantially different. Panels complied with the policy 
direction of the cited precedent in 54.2% of published decisions, 
compared to 67.9% in unpublished cases. That difference is statistically 
significant beyond the .001 level, which strongly indicates that there is a 
very different dynamic in published and unpublished cases. Non-
compliance with the policy direction of cited precedent occurred almost 










This finding makes sense if, on the whole, cases decided by 
published opinions present more legal ambiguity, and thus greater 
judicial discretion, than cases decided in unpublished opinions. Given 
greater judicial discretion to reach a decision in accordance with a panel 
majority’s policy preferences, one would expect a higher level of non-
compliance with previous decisions in such cases. Even so, three out of 
every ten unpublished decisions are non-compliant with cited precedent, 
according to the outcome-based measure. As will be discussed infra, 
however, almost all of that non-compliance occurs when a panel majority 
arrives at a conservative-direction result despite citing a liberal-direction 
precedent.41 
Table 2 displays the results of various cross-tabulations to make the 
relationships among the variables of interest more clear. The cited 
precedent’s policy direction is clearly related to whether the citing panel 
complies with it. Overall, citing panels complied with 35.3% of liberal-
direction precedents but more than three-fourths of conservative-
direction precedents (76.0%). Non-compliance, in other words, is much 
more common for liberal-direction cited precedents than for 
conservative-direction cited precedents, as expected. The same general 
relationship holds for Democratic-dominated citing panels, which 
                                                                                                             
 41 See infra Part III.A, Table 2. 
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complied with 36.9% of liberal-direction precedents but 69.7% of 
conservative-direction precedents, and for Republican-dominated citing 
panels, which complied with 33.3% of liberal-direction precedents but 
more than four-fifths of conservative-direction precedents, 83.9%. The 
most striking finding here is that the differences between panel majorities 
are much greater for conservative-direction precedents. Republican-
dominated citing panels are much more likely to comply, overall, with 
conservative-direction precedents than Democratic-dominated citing 
panels (83.9% compared to 69.7%), but Democratic-dominated citing 
panels are slightly more likely to comply with liberal-direction 
precedents than are Republican-dominated citing panels (36.9% 
compared to 33.3%). Non-compliance is much more common for both 
Democratic- and Republican-dominated panels when the cited precedent 
was decided in the liberal (usually pro-criminal defendant) direction, 
although the non-compliance rate of Democratic-dominated panels citing 
conservative-direction precedents (31.3%) was almost twice that of 
Republican-dominated panels (16.1%). These findings are generally 
consistent with the hypotheses advanced in Part II.A.42 
The composition of the citing panel is not the whole story, though. 
Publication of the citing opinion is also related to whether the citing case 
complies with the precedent’s policy direction. Overall, non-compliance 
is much more likely in published than unpublished cases, and that 
relationship holds when controlling for the policy preferences of the 
citing panel. In published opinions, Democratic-dominated citing panels 
complied with 43.3% of liberal-direction precedents and 54.2% of 
conservative-direction precedents. In other words, in published opinions, 
Democratic-dominated citing panels were almost as likely to comply 
with a liberal-direction precedent as with a conservative-direction 
precedent. 
Overall, Democratic-dominated citing panels were non-compliant 
with cited precedent in 50% of published opinions. It should be noted 
that these differences between liberal- and conservative-direction 
precedents in published opinions decided by Democratic-dominated 
panels are not statistically significant. But that is, in its own way, 
interesting. This is the only cross-tabulation in Table 2 in which the 
differences in compliance with liberal- and conservative-direction 
precedents are not statistically significant. Democratic-dominated citing 
panels are as likely to reach a liberal-direction result when citing a 
conservative-direction precedent (45.8%) as to reach a compliant liberal-
direction result (43.3%). 
                                                                                                             
 42 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. 
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In published cases, then, the policy direction of the precedent is not 
important in determining whether a Democratic-dominated panel will 
reach a liberal-direction result; they will do so about four times in ten. 
Republican-dominated citing panels, by contrast, complied with 37.5% 
of liberal-direction precedents and 74.2% of conservative-direction 
precedents in cases decided by published opinion. In other words, 
Republican-dominated panels did not comply with 62.5% of liberal-
direction precedents cited in published opinions, as compared to 25.8% 
non-compliance with cited conservative-direction precedents. These 
findings indicate, yet again, that cases decided by published opinions 
offer much greater opportunities for judges to decide cases in accord 
with (even rough measures of) their policy preferences. In cases decided 
by unpublished opinions, there is no real difference between Democratic- 
and Republican-dominated panels in terms of the policy direction of the 
results reached; Republican-dominated panels reached conservative-
direction results in 84.3% of such cases, Democratic-dominated panels in 
82.8%. But in cases decided by published opinion, there is a difference: 
Democratic-dominated panels reached a liberal-direction result in 44.9% 
of such cases compared to only 30.2% for Republican-dominated panels 
(n=262). This difference is statistically significant (at the .05 level). 
Publication means that a liberal-direction outcome is more likely, 
regardless of the preferences of the panel (but a liberal-direction outcome 
is even more likely if the panel has a Democratic majority). For this 
reason, both Democratic- and Republican-dominated panels are much 
more likely to comply with liberal-direction precedents in published 
opinions than in unpublished opinions. Given the findings discussed 
supra, it is no surprise that liberal-direction precedents are rarely 
complied with in unpublished cases—only 27.9% of the time for 
Democratic-dominated citing panels, 29.5% for Republican-dominated 
citing panels. On the other hand, this also means that both Democratic- 
and Republican-dominated panels are much less likely to comply with 
conservative-direction precedents in published cases, 54.4% and 74.2%, 
respectively, than in unpublished cases, 88.6% and 93.0%, respectively. 
Indeed, most of the non-compliance observed in cases decided by 
unpublished opinions occurred when panels reached a conservative-
direction result despite citing a liberal-direction precedent. These 
figures further highlight the differences between cases decided in 
published opinions and those decided in unpublished opinions. 
Republican-dominated panels did not comply with conservative-direction 
precedents cited in unpublished opinions only 7.0% of the time. 
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B. Logistic Regression Analysis 
To further explore the relationships among these variables, logistic 
regression analysis was employed.43 Table 3 displays the results of three 
separate logistic-regression models: (1) a model for all subsequent 
citations of precedent, (2) a model for citations in published opinions, 
and (3) a model for citations in unpublished opinions. The separate 
models were necessary given the different dynamic present in cases 
decided in published opinions compared to those decided in unpublished 
opinions.44 The dependent variable in the logistic-regression models is 
the policy direction of the citing case, Case Outcome. This variable was 
coded as one when the citing case was decided in a liberal direction and 
as zero when the citing case was decided in a conservative direction. The 
Precedent Direction variable was coded in the same way. Thus, I expect 
the coefficient for the Precedent Direction variable to take a positive 
sign, meaning that, all else being equal, a citing panel is more likely to 
decide the subsequent case in the same direction as the cited precedent. 
The Panel Majority variable is coded one for Democratic-dominated 
panels and zero for Republican-dominated panels. Thus, I expect this 
coefficient to also take a positive sign, because, all else equal, 
Democratic-dominated panels should be more likely to prefer a liberal-
direction case outcomes and Republican-dominated panels should be 
more likely to prefer conservative-direction case outcomes. Publication 
is also included in the first model as a control variable. 
In the first model, including all citations in published and 
unpublished opinions (n=499), both the Precedent Direction and Panel 
Majority variables take the expected sign (positive) and reach traditional 
levels of statistical significance, although the Panel Majority coefficient 
is significant only at the .05 level. The positive sign of the Precedent 
Direction coefficient demonstrates that compliance is more likely than 
non-compliance, even when controlling for the policy preferences of the 
citing panels and the decision to publish. The positive sign for the Panel 
Majority variable means that, even controlling for the policy direction of 
the cited precedent, the policy preferences of the citing panel still affect 
the policy direction of the Case Outcome. Thus, Democratic-dominated 
                                                                                                             
 43 Logistic regression is appropriate where the dependent variable is dichotomous, 
i.e., where the dependent variable can only take two values. See generally TIM FUTING 
LIAO, INTERPRETING LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS: LOGIT, PROBIT, AND OTHER GENERAL 
LINEAR MODELS (1994). As discussed in the text, the dependent variable here is the 
policy direction of the outcome of the citing case, which can only take the values 
“liberal” (one) or “conservative” (zero). 
 44 Cf. Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs 
and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 249 & 
n.10 (1992) (employing separate models for published and unpublished opinions). 
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panels are more likely to prefer liberal-direction outcomes, and 
Republican-dominated panels are more likely to prefer conservative-
direction outcomes, all else equal. The coefficient for the Publication 
variable is large and statistically significant. This means that a liberal-
direction Case Outcome is much more likely in a published opinion than 
in an unpublished opinion, a finding fully consistent with the discussion 



























By contrast, in the second model, which includes only subsequent 
citations in published opinions (n=262), the Precedent Direction 
coefficient does not reach statistical significance, despite taking the 
expected sign. This means that compliance is not more likely than non-
compliance in cases decided by published opinion; instead, the Precedent 
Direction variable is not affecting the Case Outcome variable one way or 
the other, once Panel Majority is accounted for. The Panel Majority 
variable does reach statistical significance in the second model, although 
again only at the .05 level. Some readers may object that the relationship 
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between the Panel Majority variable and Case Outcome is only 
marginally significant and thus that the relationship between these two 
variables is hardly overwhelming. Even conceding that point, though, the 
interesting finding here is that in published cases, the policy direction of 
the precedent does not affect the policy direction of the case outcome, 
after controlling for the policy preferences of the citing panel majority. 
In other words, using the outcome-based measure of compliance, 
compliance with the policy-direction of cited precedents is not more 
likely than non-compliance in cases decided by published opinion. In 
terms of the theoretical questions asked at the outset of this paper, judges 
on the Sixth Circuit are not likely to comply with the policy-direction of 
cited precedents in cases decided by published opinion, according to the 
outcome-based measure of compliance. 
This becomes even more clear when the third model, which 
includes only subsequent citations in unpublished opinions (n=237), is 
included in the analysis. The third model indicates that the policy 
preferences of the citing panel majority are irrelevant, after controlling 
for the policy direction of the cited precedent, in cases decided by 
unpublished opinion. In this model, the Precedent Direction coefficient 
takes the expected sign and is statistically significant. The Panel Majority 
coefficient, though, does not even approach statistical significance, 
strongly suggesting that the decisions of panels announced in 
unpublished opinions are largely determined by the policy direction of 
the cited precedents. The observed differences between published and 
unpublished cases could not be clearer. 
C. Comparing the Outcome-Based Measure to the Keycite Measure 
This Article has presented evidence that compliance with circuit 
precedent is not more likely than non-compliance in cases decided by 
published opinions, all else being equal, and that the policy preferences 
of the citing panel majority explain at least some of the non-compliance 
that occurs in cases decided by published opinion. But these findings are 
only as valid as the measure of non-compliance employed. Given the 
large number of legal issues raised in the sampled precedents, a content-
based measure of non-compliance is simply not practicable in the present 
study. But there are alternative measures of compliance at hand, 
especially Keycite. How does the outcome-based measure compare to 
Keycite’s positive and negative treatment codes? These figures are 
shown in Table 4. 
Overall, the outcome-based measure coded 60.7% of subsequent 
citations of precedent as compliant; thus, it yields an estimate of 39.3% 
non-compliant behavior in the sampled subsequent citations. The Keycite 
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codes yield corresponding estimates of 81.2% compliant behavior and 
18.8% non-compliant behavior.45 The outcome-based measure, in other 
words, yielded an estimate of non-compliant behavior more than twice 
the size of the Keycite estimate (109% greater). The same general pattern 
holds for the estimates for different values of the explanatory variables—
the outcome-based measure of non-compliance typically produces an 
estimate of non-compliance approximately twice the estimate yielded by 
Keycite. Thus, in cases decided by published opinion, Keycite yielded a 
non-compliance measure of 24.8%, compared to 45.8% for the outcome-
based measure. For published cases, then, the outcome-based estimate is 
85% greater than the Keycite estimate. In unpublished cases, the 
estimates of non-compliance are 12.2% for Keycite and 32.1% for the 
outcome-based measure; the latter is fully 163% greater than the former. 
Despite the different measures, though, the pattern is the same: non-
compliance is much greater in cases decided by published opinion, 

























                                                                                                             
 45 Lee, supra note 3, at 781. 
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For liberal-direction precedents, Keycite yielded a 24.1% estimate 
of non-compliance, compared to 64.7% for the outcome-based measure, 
a 168% greater estimate. For conservative-direction precedents, Keycite 
produced a 15.7% estimate of non-compliance, compared to 24.0% for 
the outcome-based measure, a 53% greater estimate. Again, the estimates 
are similar in that both yield greater rates of non-compliance for liberal-
direction precedents. But the difference between the outcome-based 
measure and the Keycite measure is particularly striking with respect to 
liberal-direction precedents. Liberal-direction precedents are not that 
much more likely than conservative-direction precedents to receive 
negative treatment in subsequent citations (24.1% compared to 15.7%, 
statistically significant at the .05 level). But panels citing liberal-
direction precedents reach a conservative-direction result almost two-
thirds of the time. How, exactly, panel opinions justify conservative-
direction results in such circumstances without triggering a negative 
Keycite code is not clear; but clearly, Keycite codes treat such cases as 
compliant. This finding appears to parallel that of McClurg and 
Comparato, namely, that the outcome-based measure of non-compliance 
tends to code weak forms of compliance (“positive” treatment code) as 
non-compliant (opposite policy direction).46 This difference in 
measurement may go a long way toward explaining why this Article 
finds little evidence of compliance in cases decided by published 
opinion. In other words, there is probably more compliance, especially 
“weak compliance,” in published cases than is detected using the 
outcome-based measure. 
For Democratic- and Republican-dominated citing panels, the 
outcome-based measures of non-compliance are 119% and 95% greater 
than the corresponding Keycite measures, respectively. However, the 
picture is somewhat different in that the Keycite figures are not 
substantially different depending on the composition of the panels 
(19.4% compared to 18.1%). The outcome-based measure yields 
somewhat different results (42.4% compared to 35.3%), although this 
difference is not statistically significant, either. Despite the absence of 
statistically significant differences between Democratic- and Republican-
dominated majorities, the outcome-based measure still produces higher 
estimates of non-compliance than Keycite. 
In general, the analysis using the outcome-based measure of 
compliance reaches results similar to those obtained by Keycite, although 
the estimates of non-compliance are typically twice the estimates 
produced by the Keycite measure. These findings are consistent with 
                                                                                                             
 46 See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text. 
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those of McClurg and Comparato.47 They concluded that the outcome-
based measure of compliance is biased toward non-compliance and that 
Keycite is biased toward compliance. Given the similarity in the results 
of the two studies, it is probably safe to conclude that the 39.3% figure 
derived using the outcome-based measure is a somewhat inflated 
estimate of non-compliance. A content-based measure of non-
compliance would probably yield an overall non-compliance estimate 
somewhere between 39.3% and 18.8%.48 The same probably holds for 
estimates of non-compliance based on the explanatory variables. The 
patterns observed in the data analysis also appear if one uses the Keycite 
measure of non-compliance, suggesting that, despite measurement error, 
the outcome-based measure is tracking the concept of compliance.49 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article addresses an important empirical question for scholars 
of the federal courts of appeals, namely, whether courts of appeals judges 
actually comply with circuit norms regarding precedents established in 
published panel decisions. It finds, inter alia, that judges are no more 
likely to comply than not to comply with cited circuit precedent in cases 
decided by published opinion, measuring compliance by the policy 
direction of the precedent and subsequent case. This is an interesting 
finding, suggesting that judges’ policy preferences do matter in published 
cases, regardless of circuit precedent. A different picture emerges in 
unpublished cases, in which precedent policy direction is the important 
explanatory variable. These findings may not be surprising to certain 
persons, including practitioners, based on their personal experiences and 
a wealth of anecdotal evidence. This Article, however, presents 
systematic evidence that these experiences and anecdotes reflect more 
general phenomena. Judges clearly have greater discretion in certain 
cases to reach decisions more in keeping with their policy preferences, 
and they appear to take advantage of these opportunities. Circuit 
precedent matters, but it is hardly the whole story. 
                                                                                                             
 47 See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text. 
 48 Again, it is not clear that one could formulate a content-based measure to cover the 
broad range of cases included in the present study. In addition, it must be remembered 
that the sample excludes citations to precedent without discussion, such as those in string 
citations, when not coded by Keycite as “negative” treatment. See supra Part II.B. In 
short, all these figures of non-compliance are inflated compared to a hypothetical sample 
including all subsequent citations, no matter how minimal. 
 49 The Keycite measure (negative or positive treatment) is positively correlated with 
a variable measuring whether the citing case is decided in the same direction as the cited 
precedent (r = .305, significant at the .001 level). 
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On a more theoretical level, this Article is part of a much larger 
effort to model courts of appeals decision-making.50 The leading models 
of judicial decision-making are based, either explicitly or implicitly, on 
Supreme Court justices.51 But these justices occupy a rather special place 
in the judicial hierarchy—namely, the top. Judges on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals occupy a much more difficult position to conceptualize—the 
middle. Intermediate judges must cope with both vertical and horizontal 
precedents. Vertical precedents can swiftly unsettle well-settled circuit 
precedent.52 Moreover, unlike Supreme Court justices, courts of appeals 
judges are not generally free to consider overruling horizontal 
precedents. This Article, however, suggests that circuit precedent is not a 
significant restraint on the pursuit of judicial policy preferences, at least 
not in cases decided by published opinion. Additional research is 
necessary to determine whether courts of appeals judges in the other 
circuits treat circuit precedents in the same way as judges on the Sixth 
Circuit; indeed, additional research on the Sixth Circuit is needed to 
confirm the results reported in this Article. Future research along these 
lines must work to refine measures of a number of concepts, including 
compliance, and to determine just when judges on the federal courts of 
appeals have policy discretion. This latter point is particularly important, 
given the observed differences between published and unpublished cases. 
                                                                                                             
 50 See, e.g., Donald R. Songer et al., Do Judges Follow the Law When There Is No 
Threat of Reversal? 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137, 138 (2003) (“[T]here seems to be a consensus 
that in the lower federal courts, at least some judicial decisions are influenced by the 
policy preferences of the judges, but that the exercise of discretion to advance one’s 
policy preferences is constrained by statute, precedent, and other manifestations of the 
law.”) 
 51 Over 20 years ago, Professor Howard warned scholars against “falling into the trap 
of projecting the Supreme Court onto the whole judicial process and assuming that what 
occurs in our least typical tribunal characterizes all of them.” J. WOODFORD HOWARD, 
COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, xxi (1981). Despite this warning, 
political science models still do not adequately address the lower courts. The premises of 
the attitudinal model are clearly based on the position of Supreme Court justices at the 
top of the federal judicial hierarchy. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 92-97 (2002) (explaining how 
the rules of the game free Supreme Court justices to decide cases based on their policy 
preferences). Rational choice theories also typically treat Supreme Court Justice strategic 
behavior only. See generally, LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 
(1998) (applying rational choice theory to behavior of Supreme Court justices); FORREST 
MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 
(2000). 
 52 For a discussion of “disruptive” Supreme Court precedents, see Emery G. Lee III, 
Policy Windows on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 24 JUSTICE SYS. J. 301, 301, 307-09 
(2003). 
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